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Identity-Construction and Development in the Modernist Bildungsroman 
I. 
Is it possible for a subject to ‘become’? The Bildungsroman emphasizes the importance 
of self-cultivation and self-directed education in the subject’s development. The 
Bildungsroman’s protagonist takes on these tasks with the hopes of forming, from the chaotic 
and fragmented world of childhood, a clear sense of his self and purpose.1 If the protagonist is to 
be “successful” in his development and self-cultivation, like Goethe’s Wilhelm or Dickens’s 
David Copperfield, he is able to establish unity with society and within his own mind. He 
emerges as a mature, enlightened adult with an understanding of who he is and an appreciation 
for his intersubjective position. This narrative pattern dominates the traditional Bildungsroman 
from its conception in the late 18th century, with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (1795-6), well into 
the 19th century, with English novels such as Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1847), Dicken’s David 
Copperfield (1849-50) and Great Expectations (1860-61), and Walter Pater’s Marius the 
Epicurean (1885). Near the turn of the 20th century, with the advent of modernist modes of 
creation and thinking, there is a perceptible shift in the narrative of the Bildungsroman. This 
essay focuses on the shift in perception of the self and self-development in the modernist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  essay	  examines	  the	  development	  of	  male	  protagonists	  within	  the	  modernist	  
Bildungsroman.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  and	  consistency,	  this	  essay	  uses	  male	  singular	  pronouns	  
to	  discuss	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  Bildungsroman.	  In	  no	  way	  does	  this	  imply	  that	  the	  process	  of	  
development	  portrayed	  in	  the	  Bildungsroman	  only	  applies	  to	  male	  figures.	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Bildungsroman by performing a psychoanalytic reading of Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian 
(1890) Gray and James Joyce’s The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
Whether traditional or modernist, the Bildungsroman is a narrative of self-development 
and cultivation. Buckley says that the Bildungsroman, in its “pure form” has been defined 
“‘novel of all-around development or self-culture’” (13). The term “development” connotes a 
temporal process of change. Thus, the protagonist of the Bildungsroman is dynamic; his skills, 
faculties, and philosophies are developed over the course of the narrative. Jeffers notes, “The 
hero [of the Bildungsroman] is not ‘ready-made…’ He is what Bakhtin calls ‘the image of man 
in the process of becoming’” (2). It is this ‘process’ that is the narrative focus of the 
Bildungsroman.  
Through an extended period of experimentation, rebellion, and (typically informal) 
education the protagonist of the Bildungsroman dialectically resolves conflicting ideas of who he 
is and what he desires. Though the specific process and results vary from text to text, critic 
Jerome Buckley notes that the plot of the traditional Bildungsroman can be distilled into specific 
tropes that are characteristic of the genre (17). In these works, the protagonist grows up, typically 
in a provincial setting, finding familial relations (particularly those with the paternal figure) 
antagonistic and repressive. Additionally, his formal education proves unfulfilling, stifling his 
creativity and ambitions. At some point, he journeys to the city where his “real education” 
begins.2 Working from Buckley’s paradigm, critic Paul Sheehan summarizes the following 
process as the self’s struggle “to take shape, to become fully integrated under the pressure of 
urban encounter both physical (sexual) and mental (philosophical)” (3). Following the trajectory 
of the Bildungsroman, it seems only reasonable to ask when or how this process concludes. How 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Jerome	  Hamilton	  Buckley’s	  Season	  of	  Youth	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  narrative	  
pattern	  of	  the	  Bildungsroman.	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is subject portrayed when is no longer in process? When he has ‘become’? In order to answer 
these questions, it is important to briefly discuss the Bildungsroman in a socio-historical context 
to examine this portrayal and how it evolves over time.  
The origin of the Bildungsroman is surprisingly easy to pinpoint. In Reading the 
Modernist Bildungsroman, Gregory Castle notes that, as a literary genre, the Bildungsroman is 
unique because its initial conception can be neatly tied into a particular moment in history and 
culture (34). The idea of Bildung, or self-cultivation, was first formulated in Germany during the 
late 18th century. The concept was primarily shaped by Weimar intellectuals, such as Friedrich 
von Schiller and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, as well as the Prussian philosopher, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt.3 Bildung was borne out of both Enlightenment humanism (Jeffers 3), which 
emphasized human rationality, human progress, and the importance of individual liberty in 
development. Influenced by these aspects of Enlightenment humanism, these German 
intellectuals began to see Bildung as a critical spiritual undertaking. They believed that, through 
self-cultivation, the subject could create an aesthetico-moral balance, achieving intra- and inter- 
personal harmony. With Goethe’s Wilhem Meister’s Apprenticeship, widely considered to be the 
prototype of the Bildungsroman (see Castle 9, Jeffers 9, Buckley 12), the project of self-
cultivation was streamlined into narrative form. Over the course of the plot, Wilhelm chooses 
“his sexual partners, his aesthetic interests, his career and companions, all with a view to giving 
his life the shape that pleases… himself” (Jeffers 28). All the while, his development is aided by 
the beneficent influence of the Society of the Tower. After this period of formation, he is ready 
to serve others, becoming a “citizen” and “master” (Jeffers 28).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Gregory	  Castle’s	  Reading	  the	  Modernist	  Bildungsroman	  for	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  
these	  intellectuals’	  specific	  contributions	  to	  the	  concept.	  	  
	   	   Gordon 4 
	  
From the ideals of German humanism and the tropes established in this archetypal work, 
the Bildungsroman continued to evolve through the 19th century, particularly in England. In the 
19th century English Bildungsroman, the development of the individual self is important; 
however, how the individual relates to his social context is equally (if not more) important. 
Jeffers notes that the protagonist of the English Bildungsroman is “decidedly part of his social 
milieu, and his social milieu is part of him. Intersubjectivity – life with, for, and through other 
people – is an inextinguishable determinant of his identity… the question of his responsibility to 
them isn’t sidestepped” (36). For this reason, the protagonist of the English Bildungsroman is 
even more committed to finding a suitable vocation (Castle 21). Doing so shows that he and 
society have established a mutually beneficial relationship. Additionally, finding a suitable 
partner to marry (such as Agnes for David in David Copperfield) is an important sign of stable 
maturity in the English Bildungsroman. It signals that the protagonist is done with his youthful 
gallivanting and is ready to be productive in a domestic setting. In the English Bildungsroman, 
harmony of self is largely achieved through harmonious relations with the mechanisms of society 
and others living in it.  
In spite of their differences, the aim of the Bildungsroman from the German conception 
to the English adaptation is unity for the subject. Castle succinctly establishes the two-fold nature 
of this goal by explaining at as “the harmony of one’s intellectual, moral, spiritual, and artistic 
faculties,” and “harmony of self and society” (7). The protagonist of the traditional 
Bildungsroman, on the one hand, searches for inner coherence and a clear sense of self. At the 
conclusion of the Bildungsroman, the protagonist’s use of the pronoun “I” should reference a 
stable inner reality. In addition, the protagonist of the Bildungsroman is also supposed to have 
aligned his internal values in such a way that they are deemed acceptable – even beneficial – to 
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society. The core analysis of this essay focuses on how the modernist Bildungsroman disrupts 
the ideas of unity of the self and of the self with this society, as established in this tradition.  
Near the turn of the 20th century, with the advent of modernism, the narrative of the 
traditional Bildungsroman starts to be overturned. Castle notes, “… elements that demanded 
stability and predictable development in the classical Bildungsroman – harmonious identity-
formation, aesthetic education, meaningful and rewarding social relations, a vocation – become 
problematic in the 20th century.” (24). This, in part, can be attributed to developments in various 
fields of knowledge making the understanding of “human” decidedly more complex. Sheehan 
notes that various branches of scientific theory, notably Freud in psychology and Darwin in 
biology, had begun to overturn the notion of man as the center of his own world (6). These 
theories started to call into question the ideals of Enlightenment humanism and progress that had 
shaped the themes and plots of the traditional Bildungsroman. Sheehan notes that humanism 
“possesses a certain unwavering confidence, which licenses it to enact schemas of mastery” (20). 
It is precisely those ‘schemas of mastery’ that the modernist Bildungsroman overturns in its 
narrative.   
Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray and James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man provide compelling examples of the modernist Bildungsroman’s resistance to the 
traditions established in earlier forms of the genre.4 In spite of their desire for self-cultivation, 
neither Joyce’s Stephen nor Wilde’s Dorian is able to achieve the same unity of self and society 
as their predecessors within the genre. The psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Lacan provide 
this essay with a theoretical framework for understanding how Joyce and Wilde deconstruct the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Though	  Oscar	  Wilde	  is	  often	  grouped	  with	  Victorian	  writers	  and	  this	  novel	  has	  decidedly	  
Gothic	  elements,	  this	  analysis	  views	  The	  Picture	  of	  Dorian	  Gray	  as	  an	  early	  modernist	  
Bildungsroman	  because	  of	  its	  complex,	  skeptical	  portrayal	  of	  self-­‐cultivation.	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conception of the “fully developed” self in the traditional Bildungsroman. This framework is 
used to discuss pivotal moments in each subject psychosexual development that impact the 
subject’s perception of the self. Through this framework, the reader can understand the conflicts 
occurring between the protagonists and their outer worlds, as well as the internal conflicts that 
precipitate their behaviors and actions.  Dorian, unable to resolve the confusing triadic 
relationship between his ideal-I, the punishing “real” image of his soul in the portrait, and the 
demands of the inverted symbolic order constructed by Lord Henry, fails at self-cultivation and 
self-destructs. Stephen, in contrast, seems to achieve a balance between his self-perception, his 
desire, and societal expectations; however, previous oscillations in the narrative between 
epiphany and bathos undercut the notion that he has triumphantly concluded his development.  
The contention of this essay is that Wilde’s and Joyce’s representations of subjectivity 
demonstrate that consciousness is not the manifestation of any essential, central self. Instead, 
through their psychologically complex portrayals of Dorian and Stephen, they show the self as a 
product of varied, internal and external sources that are not within the subject’s control. With 
The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the modernist 
Bildungsroman and its protagonists appear stuck in a recursive pattern of self-doubt and self-
awareness that eliminate the possibility of ‘becoming.’   
 
II. 
Freud’s theory of the tripartite psyche provides a basis for discussing the subject’s mind 
divided. This is particularly important to discussion of the Bildungsroman, because it is precisely 
this division that the narrative of development attempts to overcome. Freud’s topographical 
imagining of the psyche splits it into three operating agencies: the id, the ego, and the superego. 
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In order to understand how they affect the subject, it is important to examine them and their 
relationship with the subject and society individually.   
The id is bound up with the instinctual drives, which Freud divides into two categories: 
Eros and the death-drive. Eros, Freud says, is “the uninhibited sexual instinct proper and the 
instinctual impulses of aim-inhibited love… [and] also the self-preservation instinct” (The Ego 
and the Id 37). On the seemingly opposite end the spectrum, Freud classifies the death instinct, a 
category of destructive impulses. Whereas Eros seeks to perpetuate and unify life, Freud claims 
that the death drive seeks to “lead organic life back to its inanimate state” (The Ego and the Id 
38). Though evidence of Eros abounds in sexual desire and narcissism, the death instinct is more 
difficult to realize. It is most clearly seen in aggression; Freud describes aggression as “the 
derivative and the mean representative of the death instinct” (Civilization 69). Both instincts are 
simultaneously present in the subject, creating tension. In accordance with the pleasure-principle, 
the id constantly attempts to alleviate this tension through satisfying the demands of the drives. 
Thus, the id prioritizes wish-fulfillment, aiming at uninhibited gratification in spite of external 
demands (Wright 17). However, though the id does not prioritize these external demands, the 
subject cannot ignore their presence.  
Society and its substructures (nation, community, school, family, etc.) demand that the 
subject regulate his instincts from the onset. They enforce these demands through threats (loss of 
love, physical harm, punishment, etc.). One of the first examples of these demands is seen in the 
drama of the Oedipus complex, in which the child wishes to possess his mother and kill his 
father (his rival for her affection). Through the threat of castration, the child learns to reform this, 
and other transgressive impulses (Wright 20). For fear of the father, who is capable of castrating 
the child, the child must repress both sexual and aggressive instincts in order to protect himself. 
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This allows him to assume his appropriate “place” in the family structure. In order to prevent 
him from losing his place in this structure, the subject begins to internalize its expectations; 
however, he is also frustrated by these expectations because they restrict his ability to gratify his 
instinctual demands. The frustration the subject experiences as he tries to align his own will with 
the will of society, as previously discussed, is one of the primary conflicts of the Bildungsroman. 
Additionally, it explains one of the important divisions in the psyche. 
The external pressure for the subject to align his values and behavior with society further 
divides the subject’s psyche, creating the superego. Freud declares that “man’s sense of guilt 
springs from the Oedipus complex” (Civilization 78), asserting the complex’s pivotal importance 
in the development of the superego. As seen in the Oedipus complex, guilt plays an important 
role in keeping the subject in line with familial and societal expectations. Freud says that the 
family structure and civilization rely on the “reinforcement of the sense of guilt” within the 
subject (Civilization 80). The superego is employed to inflict this guilt and remorse on the 
subject, keeping him in line with external demands. It is a transformation of the external parental, 
religious, and societal expectations into an internal representative (Wright 16). The superego 
redirects the instinctual aggression of the subject inwardly, demanding that the subject act in 
accordance with parental and societal law, and punishing him when he transgresses these laws. 
Freud characterizes the superego as a sadistic, punishing agency, saying it “torments the sinful 
ego with … anxiety and is on the watch for opportunities of getting it punished by the external 
world” (Civilization 72). The superego and the id (discussed previously) thus place a great deal 
of tension on the subject, who experiences this tension through the conscious ego.   
The ego, which is the seat of consciousness for the subject, is tasked with balancing the 
demands of the id, the superego, and society. The ego is locked into a constant struggle with 
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these three entities as it tries to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. Freudian theory states that 
the ego is influenced by the erotic drive of self-preservation (Wright 16). Thus, the ego, in fear of 
rejection, harm, and punishment from the superego and society, must place restrictions on the 
pleasure-seeking id.  
Importantly, as consciousness, the ego also establishes a subject’s feeling of identity and 
autonomy. The ego part of the subject that he most readily identifies as “himself.” Freud, though 
he notes this as a deception, claims, “there is nothing of which we are more certain than the 
feeling of our self, of our own ego” (Civilization 12). This strong feeling of identity connects 
with the subject’s conscious thought to create his “I.” This fusion provides him with a sense of 
autonomy – it is the “I” that acts and the “I” that speaks. However, Freud undermines the 
certainty of this feeling in the subject, noting,   
the ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly 
from everything else… such an appearance is deceptive…on the contrary the ego 
is continued inwards without any sharp delimitation into the unconscious mental 
entity which we designate as the id and for which it serves as kind of a façade… 
even the feeling of our own ego is subject to disturbance and the boundaries are 
not constant. (Civilization 13)  
Here, Freud creates a dilemma with the notions of autonomy and identity, which are critical 
concepts in the discussion of the Bildungsroman. Freud links the ego, the “self” to feelings of 
‘autonomy’ and ‘unity’ (which is interpreted in this analysis as a feeling of stable identity), notes 
that these feelings are illusory. Though it is separate from consciousness, the id is attached to the 
ego and influences conscious thought. The ego is not and cannot be independent of the drives.    
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Ego-psychology, an offshoot of Freudian theory, suggests that it is this part of the ego 
that should be strengthened because this is the part of the psyche capable of social integration. 
This theory suggests that the goal of development is for ego to achieve mastery over the id and 
become a publicly adjusted identity (Wright 57). This seems to almost mirror aims of the 
traditional Bildungsroman, in which the subject must modify his behavior and sense of social 
identity in order to find his appropriate “place” in the societal structure. However, Freud’s own 
theory, with its assertion that the ego is not autonomous, but rather attached to the id, questions 
this possibility.  
Freud’s conception of the tripartite human mind splits the subject and shows it as driven 
by multiple internal forces. This severely complicates the idea that a subject can find a stable, 
autonomous identity. Instead, with Freud’s conception of the mind, the subject appears 
constituted of the id, ego, and the superego – three entities that seek to dominate one another. 
The subject, according to Freudian theory, is thus unstable and decentered.  
Lacan’s theories expand on Freud’s initial schemas to demonstrate how language 
becomes instrumental in the socialization and the development of the subject. Though Freud 
does address the illusory nature of the ego’s control, he does not address the reasons for this. 
Lacan further undermines the idea that the ego can control the subject by explaining that the 
subject is barred, through language, from understanding and representing himself. Consciousness 
operates in both language (which comes from without) and images (which can only be discussed 
or understood in language/through symbols). Neither images nor language are capable of 
explaining the complex functions of the body and drives to the individual. Barred from the 
complexities of its own body and internal mechanisms, Freud’s ego, as the center of the 
consciousness, is unable to fully understand what it is, what it needs, and what it desires. Lacan’s 
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theory, with its emphasis on language, suggests that the subject cannot reach a terminus in 
development seen in the traditional Bildungsroman. Instead, the subject will continuously 
struggle with a desire, forever anticipating a unity it cannot achieve.  
According to Lacan, the subject is constituted of three interconnected psychical orders: 
the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. Lacan’s three orders are largely based on a thorough 
revision of Freud’s theories of the psyche and psychosexual development. As the reader shall 
discern, aspects of the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic correspond with Freud’s id, ego, 
and superego, respectively. However, whereas the id, ego, and superego are separate agents 
contained with the subject, the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic are systems that govern the 
aspects of subjectivity. These systems dictate what the subject can and cannot control in himself, 
and what the subject can and cannot understand about himself. In this analysis, Lacan’s theory is 
used to show the illusory nature of the subject’s sense of “self,” and to demonstrate the subject’s 
inability to understand his own desire and exercise autonomy. By applying Lacan’s theory to the 
modernist Bildungsroman, the essay aims to show how the conflicting and interrelated aspects of 
subjectivity prevent their protagonists from reaching that unity of the self that is displayed in 
earlier novels of the tradition. 
Though Lacan’s three orders cannot be unified or assimilated within the subject to create 
a singular “self,” they are undoubtedly intertwined. Lacan explains the relationship between the 
three orders through comparison with the Borromean knot. He explains that no order is 
preeminent, and, if one is cut, the whole system will fall apart (Wright 115). In other words, 
there is no singular aspect of Lacan’s organization that corresponds more closely than the other 
with the subject. In discussing the subject then, it is nearly impossible to separate discussion of 
one order and its corollaries from another. The account that follows tries to distinguish each of 
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the orders’ characteristics, and the components of experience and subjectivity that each 
establishes.  
The unified sense of self is directly undermined by Lacan’s initial order, the Real. The 
Real, in one sense, is a state of being linked to a specific time in development (before the subject 
anticipates the “self” in the mirror stage, and before he assimilates language).  In his seminar on 
“The Topic of the Imaginary,” Lacan describes the Real as “not delimited by anything, [the Real 
is that] which cannot yet be the object of any definition… neither good, nor bad, but is all at the 
same time chaotic and absolute” (Seminar II 79). The Real is ‘absolute’ because it has yet to be 
differentiated or divided by language, and ‘chaotic’ because of the subject’s inability to express 
or meet his own needs. In the Real, the subject has the experience of being in an amorphous state 
(Wright 110) in which its own need, senses, lack, and satisfaction have no boundaries. He must 
rely on others to interpret signs of his needs (i.e., crying) and provide satisfaction. This state of 
existence starts to end when the subject begins to distinguish between himself and the external 
world in the Mirror Stage. The subject is completely barred from the Real when he assimilates 
language.   
For this analysis, the Real as a state of existence has no bearing (though an explanation 
this state is necessary in order for the reader to contextualize the Imaginary and Symbolic). The 
reason for this is that, in every iteration of the form, the protagonist of the Bildungsroman has 
already differentiated the boundaries of self and other, and been assimilated into language. The 
Real factors into this discussion as it appears as disruptions to the sense of self and structures set 
up in the Imaginary and the Symbolic. The Real can be described as both what has not yet been 
symbolized and what cannot be symbolized. Some aspect of it always persists alongside the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic (Fink 25-27). Slavoj Žižek, a contemporary philosopher and expert 
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in Lacanian psychoanalysis, characterizes the Real as “traumatic,” saying that ‘reality’ (which in 
Lacanian terms signifies the Symbolic and the Imaginary - those orders through which the 
consciousness can conceptualize and identify) functions “as an escape from encountering the 
Real” (57). This analysis explores anxiety, disruptions in language, and doubt of the “self” as 
evidence of the Real. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that the notions of identity 
constructed and sustained in the Imaginary and Symbolic are subject to disturbance. In order to 
explore how identity or “self” is disturbed, however, it is first necessary to understand how it is 
established, as well as its effects and implications. 
For Lacan, the ego (the self) is not the subject; it is rather an object created in a process 
that he terms the Mirror Stage. During the Mirror Stage, an infant (6-18 mos.) sees his image in 
the mirror. It is a jubilant moment of recognition, and he bestows this image with special 
significance through his identification with it. Lacan describes this as the moment in which “the I 
is precipitated in primordial form” (“The Mirror Stage” 76). In other words, the Mirror Stage 
‘causes’ the sense of self, ‘the I,’ even before the subject assimilates language. In the Real, this 
sense of self did not exist; the infant subject did not perceive any boundaries between the internal 
and external. Jane Gallop notes that the image apprehended in the Mirror Stage “becomes a 
totalizing ideal that organizes and orients the self…” (79). This totalizing process is what allows 
the individual to distinguish between the internal and the external.   
The notion of self, established in the Mirror Stage, does not correspond with the whole 
subject in actuality. This is central to Lacan’s theorization of the Mirror Stage - he says that the 
“important point” is that the totalizing form of the image “situates the agency known as the 
ego… in a fictional direction” (“The Mirror Stage as Formative” 76). He calls this fictionalized 
ego the “ideal-I” or “ideal-ego” which which Žižek explains as “the way I would like to be, the 
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way I would like others to see me” (80). There is, however, according to Lacan, an ineradicable 
gap between this ideal-ego and the subject. The union between the subject and his image is a 
moment of méconnaissance, of misrecognition. Lacan says that this is because image is given to 
him as a “total form” or “gestalt,” and that it is through this totalizing form that “the subject 
anticipates the maturation of his power” (76).  The image appears as an unbroken union of inner 
and outer, promising the self-mastery that allows immediate satisfaction of desire (Wright 110). 
Such a union is illusory, however; there can be no such guarantee. The subject is thus alienated 
from the self. In Lacanian terms, the self is an other.  
    Through the Mirror Stage, with the acknowledgement of the “self,” the subject is initiated 
into the Imaginary. Discussion of the Imaginary is critical to the Bildungsroman in this 
framework because it, in large, part determines how the subject relates to himself and others. In 
Lacanian theory, the Imaginary is the realm of object relations. The ego, the sense of self, is the 
foremost Imaginary object which attracts the subject’s libidinal investment (Fink 84). Lacan 
notes that this object is “the rootstock of secondary identifications” (“The Mirror Stage as 
Formative” 76). The formation of the ego is what allows the subject to form relationships with 
others in the Imaginary. These relationships are relationships between egos, determined by the 
opposition between likeness, which incites love, and difference, which incites hatred (Fink 84). 
The relationship between the self and others is further determined by the subject’s assimilation of 
language. 
Lacan states that once the subject assimilates language and enters the Symbolic, “the 
specular I turns into the social I” (“The Mirror Stage” 79). Once the subject enters into language, 
he is situated into society and governed by his rules. The Symbolic attempts to control the Real 
aspect of the subject that threatens its organization (Wright 112). Lacan notes that entry into the 
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Symbolic “turns the I into the apparatus to which every instinctual pressure constitutes a danger, 
even if it corresponds to a natural maturation process” (“The Mirror Stage” 79). The subject is 
now expected to obey social imperatives, which demand that the subject place restrictions on 
himself. The subject is also expected to express needs and demands in ways that are acceptable, 
or at least recognizable to the Other.  
The Other is the virtual entity that governs the Symbolic Order. The Other has multiple 
faces. In one sense, it is language itself. It is also the abstract structures and ideas put into place, 
attributed power, and sustained through language: knowledge, law, ideals, morals, History, 
Nature (see Fink 87, Žižek 9, 41). The Other has power insofar as humans attribute it with 
meaning.  Žižek says, “it is the substance of the individuals who recognize themselves in it, the 
ground their whole existence, the point of reference that provides the ultimate horizon of 
meaning” (10). The main idea captured here is that the Other holds a privileged place in the 
subject’s existence.  
Lacan’s formula that man’s desire is “the Other’s desire” (qtd. in Žižek 41) captures the 
critical effect of Symbolic initiation. This effect is multi-faceted; this formula contains multiple 
meanings. One shade of meaning can be determined by looking at the Other as language itself. In 
this sense, the Other literally determines the subject’s desire. Desire can only be formulated in 
terms of language. In another sense, it is through language that the desire of Other(s) enters the 
consciousness of the subject. The desire of the Other flows into the subject through discourse 
(Fink 9). Evidence can be seen in Freud’s formulation of the super-ego, in which the subject 
internalizes external constructions of morality and uses it to govern his own behavior. In a final 
sense, the subject desires the desire of the Other. Žižek says that the Other confronts the subject 
with an “enigmatic desire” (42), which frustrates the subject as it seeks to find the answer to this 
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question. It is important to note that in Lacan’s theory, desire is not something that can be 
satisfied. “Desire, strictly speaking, has no object… [it is] fundamentally caught up in the 
dialectical movement of one signifier to the next” (90).  Desire for the subject then can never be 
understood or satisfied.   
The Symbolic order further determines the “I” established in the Imaginary. Language 
gives the subject tools to identify himself as himself and conceptualize his relationship with 
Others. However, the inherent problem with this identification is that it can only be discussed in 
the Other that is language (Fink 7). The subject is therefore not able to understand or discuss 
himself as he really is. The effect of initiation into the Symbolic is that the conscious self is 
forever barred from the subject. The conscious self can only think in language, and therefore can 
only think from the position of the Symbolic. It cannot access the Real parts of itself, but only 
those constructed by language. Žižek explores the “unsettling” effect of this alienation by 
posturing, “I am deprived of even my most intimate subjective experience, the way things ‘really 
seem to me’ … the core of my being, since I can never consciously experience and assume it.” 
(53). The subject can never fully realize the way he is or what he desires, nor can he see the 
complex effect of the Symbolic, Imaginary, and the Real that structure his idea of the self.  
Together, Freud and Lacan’s theories work to show the subject as decentered, providing 
solid psychoanalytic framework for discussing the subject of the modernist Bildungsroman. The 
sense of self for the subjects in these novels frequently shifts and changes, demonstrating a 
difficulty in cultivating a complete and stable notion of “self.” These theories provide a critical 
vocabulary for explaining the alienation seen between subject and their sense of self and desire 
in the modernist Bildungsroman. Lacan and Freud show the subject as split between trying to 
sustain different aspects of a very contrived ‘reality’ for a sense of control, trying to fulfill the 
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needs of their instincts, their own desire, and the desire of other. These various demands place 
pressure on the subject, and cannot be found in one simple solution, requiring the subject to 
continuously and unconsciously shift his focuses. The divisions in the Freudian and Lacanian 
conception of the subject eliminate the possibility of a stable sense of self, which explains the 
recursive shifts between elation and bathos in the modernist Bildungsroman. Most importantly, 
these theories prompt the reader to examine those aspects of the self that the subject must repress 
to gain a sense of autonomy, asking the reader to redefine what autonomy is. 
III.  
The Picture of Dorian Gray, with its decidedly Gothic elements and its date of 
publication (1890), does not fit exclusively into the modernist cannon; however, a reading of this 
novel as a modernist text is by no means unfounded or obscure. In fact, both Gregory Castle’s 
Reading the Modernist Bildungsroman and Paul Sheehan’s Modernism and the Aesthetics of 
Violence do so without explanation or justification. The psychological depth of the novel’s 
characters and its narrative mode make it difficult not to associate The Picture of Dorian Gray 
with more traditional examples of modernist writing. Michael Gillespie asserts that, The Picture 
of Dorian Gray, “through the multiple perspectives imbedded in the narrative … encourages 
diverse readings, anticipating the direction taken by the experimental efforts of twentieth-century 
fiction” (qtd. in Wenaus 60). The Picture of Dorian Gray achieves this complexity through a 
free-indirect discourse style that, though told in the third-person, allows the reader to access the 
stream-of-conscious thought of multiple characters. Additionally, plot of The Picture of Dorian 
Gray is rife with modernist skepticism. With Dorian’s degeneration into debauchery, crime, and 
eventually death, Wilde undermines the Enlightenment notion that the subject can, through 
conscious effort, self-reflection, and reason arrive with clarity at one’s ability, one’s purpose, and 
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one’s place in the world. Instead the novel is much more cynical about the subject’s ability and 
authority in his own self-definition and discovery. 
By shifting the center of consciousness in the narrative perspective throughout, The 
Picture of Dorian Gray effectively demonstrates Dorian’s character development as an 
intersubjective process. It is not merely Dorian who determines his own fate, but also the desires 
of Basil and Lord Henry. In the first place, Castle notes, their “influence over Dorian spurs on 
him to make the perverse wish that projects his own actual physical and moral development into 
the proximate space of the picture” (154). Basil continues to influence Dorian by trying to 
repress him under an ideal, while Lord Henry seduces him into his New Hedonism. As will be 
demonstrated, both have determining (and detrimental) effects.  
 The Imaginary Image  
In order to understand the transformative effect of the portrait, it is first essential to 
understand how Wilde constructs Dorian preceding his encounter with it. Dorian is not initially 
characterized through his own behavior or actions, but rather through a dialogic exchange 
between other subjects. In the first scene of the novel, Basil and Lord Henry discuss Dorian at 
length, but he is not there to participate. Therefore, he does not form himself for the reader – 
Basil and Lord Henry do. Dorian appears as a “compelling tabula rasa” for Basil and Lord Henry 
(Castle 141); he has not yet begun the process of self-cultivation and development. Dorian’s 
naivety further emphasized in descriptions that make him appear exceedingly innocent, and 
childlike – Basil says that he possesses a “simple and beautiful nature” (55) and Lord Henry 
thinks that he seems to have “kept himself unspotted from the world” (57). Dorian has not yet 
been developed through time or experience. It is the portrait itself that catalyzes Dorian’s 
development by giving him the feeling of his own ego.  
	   	   Gordon 19 
	  
Basil’s portrait has a transformative effect on Dorian because it is so imbued with Basil’s 
own desire. Basil recalls, “‘When our eyes met, I felt that I was growing pale… I knew that I had 
come face to face with someone whose mere personality was so fascinating that, if I allowed it to 
do so, it would absorb my whole nature’” (Wilde 48). This recollection intermixes the language 
of attraction and anxiety, showing the immense power Dorian has over Basil. For Basil, Dorian 
represents the ultimate aesthetic ideal, “the harmony of soul and body” (Oates 422). Basil says, 
“His personality has suggested to me an entirely new manner in art, an entirely new mode of 
style… I can now re-create life in a way that was hidden from me before” (51). Dorian is for 
Basil what Lacan refers to as the “object cause,” a representative of the ultimate signifier that 
allows him to create meaning through art. As a result, the desire Basil feels for Dorian is 
overwhelming. Craft says that Basil addresses this by “[translating] his sexually charged desire 
for Dorian into disciplined artistic production” (120). Basil “sublimates” his desire into creation 
(Civilization 44); however, it seems that evidence of desire persists in the completed work. 
Though the portrait itself is not described, Basil’s confession, “‘I felt, Dorian, that I had put too 
much of myself in it’” (Wilde 149), indicates that his desire for Dorian is inscribed in the image. 
It is no wonder that Dorian himself is so drawn to it.  
         Dorian’s identification with his image in the portrait has determinative effects on his 
development. The moment Dorian sees himself in the portrait is described as positively 
transformative: “A look of joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the first 
time... The sense of his own beauty came on him like a revelation. He had never felt it before” 
(Wilde 65, emphasis added). The diction used, specifically the words “joy” and revelation,” 
characterize this moment with all of the ‘jubilance’ of Lacan’s Mirror Stage (“The Mirror Stage” 
75). This jubilance can be attributed to the fact that it is a moment of specular identification, of 
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“self”-recognition. Dorian does not see the portrait as merely a representation, but actually as a 
reflection of “himself.” Due to this misrecognition, it is apparent that though it is a reproduction, 
the portrait functions symbolically as a mirror. It is thus able to produce, in Dorian, the feeling of 
his own ego. It is also a moment, as Freud says, in which “the boundary lines between the ego 
and the external world become uncertain” (Civilization 13). The use of the portrait as a fulcrum 
for Dorian’s sense of self emphasizes the self as an artificially constructed object rather than an 
essential or inherent entity. Additionally, it demonstrates how sensitive subject’s sense of self is 
to external disturbance.  
 It is important to note the role that Basil and Lord Henry play in confirming this moment 
of méconnaissance. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the subject’s idea of “himself” is 
not merely formed in the Imaginary order, but also in the Symbolic, through language. In the 
Lacanian Mirror Stage, it is the parents that drive the infant child into specular identification with 
his own image through holding him up to the mirror (“The Mirror Stage” 76). In The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, Lord Henry and Basil serve this parental function, confirming Dorian’s Imaginary 
identification with his image through discourse. Lord Henry states that the portrait is, “‘the real 
Dorian Gray – that is all’” (Wilde 67). Then, when Dorian asks, “‘Is [the portrait] the real 
Dorian?” (Wilde 69, emphasis added), Basil assents. Through these exchanges, Craft asserts that 
Dorian “is seduced into specular identification with an erotically charged image of himself” 
(121). Through this intersubjective exchange, it is easy to understand how Dorian’s perception of 
“himself” comes to be shaped through the language of others.  
The portrait gives Dorian a sense of his own beauty and incites his desire. As Vicki 
Mahaffey notes, Basil produces Dorian’s “consciousness of the body through his mirror-portrait” 
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(“Père-version” 254). Dorian’s identification with his image incites his narcissism.5 When 
Dorian sees his portrait, he stands, “gazing at the shadow of his own loveliness” (Wilde 65). The 
term “gazing” has romantic and sexual connotations, and thus indicates that Dorian has a sexual 
and romantic investment in himself. Dorian’s narcissism gives him an awareness of his own 
sexual desire. The language describing how he views himself is extremely erotic – he feels a 
sense of “pleasure” (Wilde 65) at his own image.  
Through the realization of his beauty and desire, Dorian comes to understand the 
influence he has over others. As discussed previously, the subject’s apprehension of himself in 
the mirror provides him with a false anticipation of self-mastery and power (“The Mirror Stage” 
76). It provides a visual union that ensures the immediate satisfaction of desire. In his specular 
image, the power that Dorian anticipates his ability to provoke sexual desire – the term “gazing” 
also indicates an awareness that he is an object and therefore can be seen by others who will 
admire his beauty. Suddenly, the compliments Basil had given him, which he had dismissed as 
“charming exaggerations of friendship,” (Wilde 65) appear in his conscious mind and bear new 
significance. Dorian believes that because he is beautiful and has the power to influence others 
with this beauty, he is capable of fulfilling his own desire It is Dorian’s awareness of himself as a 
sexual object that later allows him to consciously control and manipulate others. Realizing the 
luxury that his beauty affords him, he becomes anxious at the idea of the eventual loss of his 
power, which will fade with his temporary state of beauty. 
     The portrait not only incites narcissism and power in Dorian, but also alienation and fear. 
It serves to remind him of his own instability and lack of control – the portrait’s permanence, by 
contrast, draws attention to the short-lived power he enjoys from being beautiful. Though he 
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identifies with his empowering beauty, he also sees himself as an object that can and will be 
influenced and changed. This understanding undermines the feelings of control he gains from his 
identity, and he is stricken with fear: “He would become dreadful, hideous, and uncouth… As he 
thought of it, a sharp pang of pain struck through him like a knife” (Wilde 65). Confronted, once 
again through remembering the words of Lord Henry, with the temporary nature of his beauty, 
Dorian imagines himself aging with language that indicates extreme dread, fear, and disgust. The 
very thought of undergoing any physical change psychologically ‘wounds’ Dorian, as it threatens 
to dismantle the feelings of power he had newly found with the appreciation of his own beauty. 
Fantasy and Incompatible Desire 
Though he does not (and, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis, cannot) realize it, 
Dorian’s desire for Sibyl is rooted in fantasy. The theatre setting, in which their brief courtship 
takes place, emphasizes and contributes to Dorian’s view of Sibyl as an idealized image. In the 
position of spectator, he passively observes her as she enacts the passions and temperaments of 
all of Shakespeare’s heroines. Dorian proclaims, “She is everything to me in life. Night after 
night I go to see her play. One evening she is Rosalind, and the next she is Imogen” (Wilde 93). 
The verb “is” in place of ‘plays’ or ‘portrays’ indicates the blurring of fantasy and reality. As 
critic Paul Sheehan observes, the roles that Sibyl enacts are, for Dorian, more real than Sibyl 
herself: “[Dorian’s] desire is focused on her theatrical performances not for their dramatic 
expressiveness… but as a denial that they are performances” (“A Malady of Dreaming” 76). To 
Dorian, Sibyl is a neutral medium, a “figure of imaginative mobility” onto which the finest 
theatric renditions of feminine sexuality can be scripted (“A Malady of Dreaming” 76). 
Dorian attempts to preserve his desire for Sibyl by keeping her at a distance. In his dialogue with 
Lord Henry, Dorian unwittingly reveals that he has no interest in knowing her personally. When 
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the theater manager offers to tell him about Sibyl’s background, Dorian refuses to listen. He later 
justifies this refusal by saying, “‘Sibyl is the only thing I care about. What is it to me where she 
came from?’” (Wilde 93). The comic irony of this statement demonstrates Dorian’s unconscious 
wish to keep Sibyl locked in his fantasy of her as neutral medium for artistic expression. He 
rejects information about her history because it threatens to adulterate his image of her as an 
artistic ideal with details that are all too human. 
Since Dorian’s desire for Sibyl is based on a phantasmic image, Dorian is not only 
unwilling to approach her personally, but also sexually. In spite of his proclamations of his desire 
for her, Dorian actually seems repulsed when Lord Henry inquires about his “actual” sexual 
relations with Sibyl: he exclaims in indignation, “‘Harry! Sibyl Vane is sacred!’” (Wilde 91). 
Aside from underscoring (once again) Dorian’s idealization of Sibyl, Dorian’s exclamation raises 
an essential question for understanding how Wilde constructs desire in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray: if Dorian so desires Sibyl, why is he unwilling to touch her? His reasoning, that she is 
“sacred,” indicates that he perceives in her a pure or spiritual quality which would be marred by 
sexual contact. Dorian’s desire for Sibyl is not merely an erotic drive for pleasure. It cannot be 
satisfied by the possession of Sibyl as an object (i.e., through sexual gratification). Sibyl is for 
Dorian what Lacan refers to as the “object a in fantasy, which desire substitutes for [the Other]” 
(“The Subversion of the Subject” 697). Dorian sees Sibyl as an ideal of aesthetic beauty. It seems 
clear that Dorian does not desire to possess Sibyl, but rather what she represents.  
When Dorian wins Sibyl’s passion, causing her to abandon her acting, his desire 
disappears. Brought so close to her, he is unable to sustain his idealized image of her, and is 
forced to realize her alterity. Unlike Dorian, Sibyl feels aesthetic beauty is secondary to love. She 
tells Dorian, “‘You had brought me something higher, something of which all art is but a 
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reflection” (123).  For her, desire is not attached to art, but rather to what she perceives as Love. 
While Dorian believes that all knowledge resides in Beauty, Sibyl believes that it resides in 
Love. Having felt this Love, Sibyl no longer feels that she can artistically give it justice through 
her performance: “I might mimic a passion that I do not feel, but I cannot mimic one that burns 
in me like fire” (123). In order to retain her as a symbol of Beauty, Dorian wants to keep her at 
the distance that allows him to possess his Imaginary image of her, but Sibyl desires to approach 
closer. Working from Lacan’s theories, Žižek posits “a sexual relation, in order to function, has 
to be screened through some fantasy” (54). A sexual relation cannot exist between Dorian and 
Sibyl because their fantasies are mutually incompatible. In this interaction, he is forced into the 
realization of her otherness, by understanding now that their desires are not the same. She does 
not want to perform for him anymore. This realization is, of course only temporary, and with her 
death, Dorian is once again permitted to view Sibyl through the lens of fantasy.  
By viewing Sibyl’s suicide as an artistic act, Dorian is able to retain his conception of her 
as an image and dismiss any personal responsibility for her suicide. Though, initially, Dorian’s 
superego punishes him for his cruelty to her, he ultimately responds to her death with numbness. 
As Dickson notes, Dorian is able to “become a spectator of his own life to escape its suffering” 
(10). Dorian confesses to Lord Henry, “‘I must admit that this thing that has happened does not 
affect me as it should. It seems to me to be simply like a wonderful ending to a wonderful play’” 
(Wilde 135). His very contrived view of who Sibyl is protects him from the grief that he feels. 
To Dorian, Sibyl’s suicide is the final act of a “wonderful play.” Even after most she has 
thoroughly broken the fourth wall, so to speak, in their previous interaction, her death makes it 
so that he no longer has to interact with her as a subject. He is thus permanently sealed into the 
view of her as a representative of aesthetic beauty. He tells a distraught Basil, “When [Sibyl] 
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knew [love’s] unreality, she died, as Juliet might have died. She passed again into the sphere of 
art” (Wilde 144). By noting a similar pattern in the death of Sibyl Vane and the suicides of 
Shakespeare’s tragic heroines, Dorian is able give her suicide aesthetic meaning. 
This scene reveals how fantasy, adopted as ‘reality,’ serves to protect the subject from the 
traumatic Real. Through the lens of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, Dorian is able is able to 
deal with the senselessness of Sibyl’s suicide. Henry’s description of tragedy reminds the reader 
of the Real element of death. Henry says that tragedies often “occur in crude violence… absolute 
incoherence” and “give us an impression of sheer brute force” (Wilde 136). His use of the word 
“incoherence” shows the purpose for tragedy is beyond symbolization. The mind and subject 
cannot make sense of, and cannot reason with tragedy. It is thus an immense source of fear. 
Dorian, however, is spared from confronting this fear through the fantasy he has created. This 
fantasy plays a role in his moral disintegration. Paul Sheehan says that this episode prompts 
Dorian to believe that “‘vulgarity’ and ‘beauty’ are not just parts of an aesthetic vocabulary; they 
can be applied to the most significant human concerns” (“A Malady of Dreaming” 78). Spared 
from the Real, Dorian is able to retain his peace of mind; however, he is also prevented from 
learning compassion, responsibility, or empathy.  
The Distorted Image 
 Dorian’s cruel treatment of Sibyl serves as a catalyst in the plot for the supernatural 
changes that occur in the portrait. Dorian’s earlier wish for eternal youth drives this Gothic 
progression of the story (Castle 154): the reader is reminded of this through Dorian’s memory of 
himself ‘uttering’ the “mad wish” in Basil’s studio (Wilde 127). When he comes back from the 
theater, Dorian observes an uncanny change the portrait’s composition: the “ardent sunlight 
showed him the lines of cruelty round the mouth [of the figure in the portrait] as clearly as if he 
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had been looking into a mirror” (Wilde 126-7). The use of simile here, again, indicates Dorian’s 
misrecognition of the portrait as reflective of reality. However, through the Gothic elements of 
the novel, it seems that Dorian’s misrecognition of the portrait as “reality” is coming true in an 
unexpected way. Wenaus describes the “new” portrait as an “object that signifies the level-
crossing of … [the] ontological divisions of body and soul” (66). This crossing gives Dorian the 
idea that his soul can be displayed, as his body can, as a “whole” image. By the end of Chapter 
VIII, Dorian refers to the portrait as “the most magical of mirrors” (Wilde 141). Whereas 
previously Dorian used the term “mirror” as a comparative figure of speech, the term “mirror” 
here directly references the portrait. Dorian believes the portrait to display a “real” and complete 
rendering of his inner mechanisms.  
Even as the portrait begins to decay, Dorian finds it to be a source of narcissistic pleasure. 
This is, on one hand, due to the simple fact that he believes it to be an image of himself and is 
therefore drawn to it. Dorian’s investment in the image is, however, more complex. Dorian, 
initially, “would examine [the portrait] with minute care, and sometimes with a monstrous and 
terrible delight, the hideous lines that seared the wrinkling forehead… He mocked the misshapen 
body and the failing limbs” (Wilde 162). As seen in his cruel delight at the portrait’s decay, the 
pleasure he derives from the portrait is also sadistic. This feeds his narcissism by giving him a 
sense of power. It seems that, though the portrait may be able to protect him from physical 
decay, it cannot stop, and actually enables his moral decay.  
Evidence of Dorian’s moral decay is given in the novel’s climax, when he murders the 
portrait’s creator. In spite of Dorian’s insistence that there is more to his soul than Basil would 
recognize, Basil is rigid, insisting that he hold onto this ideal. When Dorian affirms his own 
history of transgressive actions for Basil, Basil exclaims, “‘Deny them, Dorian, deny them! Can’t 
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you see what I’m going through? My God! don’t tell me you are bad, corrupt, and shameful’” 
(Wilde 185). If the reader needs any more evidence that the feelings Basil has towards Dorian 
are narcissistic, it occurs in this moment. For his own benefit, Basil asks Dorian to deny his 
actions, as though Dorian is an extension of himself. Instead, Dorian chooses to shock Basil and 
to show him how his own desire to construct Dorian as a perfect and pure ideal of beauty has 
instead produced the opposite effect. Mahaffey says that Basil represents, “the ‘good’ mother, 
the champion of conventional morality propped up by Victorian repression,” and asserts, “Dorian 
is seized with an irresistible need to show Basil the rotten fruit of his idealism” (“Père-version” 
255). Basil’s insistence in reducing Dorian to this object, even after Dorian has been separated 
from him for some time now, angers Dorian and results in aggression. However, the aggression 
he feels is both the result of his frustration with his ability to live up to the image that Basil has 
constructed of him and resentment at the idea that he should have to. 
The ambivalence Dorian feels towards the portrait is reflected in the dialogue between 
himself and Basil in this pivotal scene. On the one hand, Dorian explicitly blames Basil and his 
portrait for the change in his character: “‘I was wrong. [The portrait] has destroyed me’” (Wilde 
188). Ashamed at his inability to reach the ideal-ego constructed in the initial portrait, he uses the 
portrait, and Basil who created it, as scapegoats for his frustration. However, the same 
narcissistic pride revealed in his earlier adoration of the portrait is also present. He watches Basil 
view the portrait with, “… the passion of a spectator…. A flicker of triumph in his eyes’” (Wilde 
187). Dorian is proud of this image of “himself,” and takes pleasure in the feelings of horror it 
produces. Though the portrait’s surface has changed significantly, he still invests in it the 
significance of it being “himself” and gains a sense of power from it. 
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When Dorian realizes that Basil rejects the complexity of his subjectivity, Dorian feels 
threatened and is compelled to kill him; through this act, he likewise reduces Basil to an object. 
When Basil responds with horror at Dorian’s image, Dorian responds, “‘Each of us has Heaven 
and Hell in him, Basil’ … with a wild gesture of despair’” (Wilde 188). This paradoxical 
epigram reflects Dorian’s own inner ambivalence and conflict, the various aspects of his subject-
hood that he attempts to resolve. Basil, does not, however, does not seem to believe this inner 
duality is possible and attempts to bind his conception of Dorian to the binary opposition of his 
ideal. Basil’s view of Dorian as beautiful and pure flips to a realization of him as ugly and 
corrupt. He quiets Dorian saying, “‘You have done enough evil in your life!’” (Wilde 189), and 
attempts through prayer to revert the image in the portrait back to what it was before without 
Dorian’s consent. Basil’s hatred of the portrait, however, rids Dorian’s ambivalence of it, and he 
responds in defense at Basil’s second attempt to reduce him to an ideological conception. “‘The 
mad passions of a hunted animal stirred within him, and he loathed the man who was seated at 
the table, more than in his whole life he had ever loathed anything’” (Wilde 189). The 
comparison of his passion here to those of a hunted animal, not only serve to show the very raw, 
instinctual aggression of Dorian towards Basil but also the cause. The word ‘hunted’ here 
connotes the feeling in Dorian that he is a victim, that Basil is trying to capture or kill a piece of 
him. He responds in self-defense through violence. Dorian then effectively strips Basil of his 
own subjectivity, first killing him and then having Alan destroy the body. The chapter concludes: 
“the thing that had been sitting at the table was gone” (Wilde 204). The narrative voice, 
reflecting Dorian’s inner consciousness, no longer calls Basil by his name, but rather a “thing.” 
Dorian has turned Basil into an object. 
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Though the murder of Basil is typically viewed as the decisive example of Dorian’s 
corruption, it is also symbolically appropriate. Basil initiates the trajectory of Dorian’s 
development with his desire, drawing Dorian’s attention to himself and shaping the way that he 
relates to others. Basil, through his portrait, gives Dorian the illusion of power and completion 
that he can never truly have, especially since Basil’s ideal demands that Dorian represses key 
aspects of his subject-hood through repressive morality.  
The Symbolic  
  While the portrait incites Dorian’s ego-conception through Imaginary identification, 
Dorian’s sense of self is also shaped through language in the Symbolic order. Dorian is exposed 
to language through social and textual interaction. Both have determining effects on his 
character. As critic Andrew Wenaus notes, in The Picture of Dorian Gray, the “self” appears as 
“a product of society and a social artefact” (63). The construction of the relationship between 
Lord Henry and Dorian Gray particularly serves to demonstrate how desire and self-perception 
are constructed through the discourse of others.  
Lord Henry’s ability to influence Dorian, and indeed even his will to do so, is the effect 
of his desire for the boy. His desire is very apparent: upon seeing Dorian for the first time, Lord 
Henry thinks, “Yes, he was certainly wonderfully handsome, with his finely-curved scarlet lips, 
his frank blue eyes… No wonder Basil Hallward worshipped him” (Wilde 57). The language 
here, which lingers on the curve of Dorian’s lips and sanctions Basil’s devotion, is not merely 
admiring, but sensuous. Though the text never authorizes any overtly sexual contact between 
these two characters, the language of their interactions continues to be suffused with homoerotic 
longing. Žižek explains, “the subject desires only in so far as it experiences the Other itself as 
desiring” (42). Where Basil attempts to repress his desire for Dorian, Lord Henry does not. Thus, 
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unrestricted, he is able to use his desire, and the corresponding desire that it incites in Dorian, to 
influence Dorian in a way that Basil never is able to. 
The specific attention that the narrative gives to Lord Henry’s vocal and linguistic 
capabilities emphasizes the influential power of his words. Lord Henry is characterized as a 
loquacious yet skillful orator. He monologues at length, punctuating his speeches with pseudo-
philosophical witticisms, such as “‘Intellect is in itself a mode of exaggeration, and destroys the 
harmony of the face’” (Wilde 45). Though his clever quips are often shallow, he is deeply 
engaging. At his aunt’s dinner party, he is said to have “charmed his listeners out of themselves” 
(Wilde 77). His voice itself is frequently described as musical and pleasing. This quality is, in 
fact, one of the first things that Dorian observes about him: “And he had such a beautiful voice” 
(Wilde 58). Later, Dorian tells Henry, “‘No one talks so wonderfully as you do’” (Wilde 82). 
Lord Henry’s linguistic abilities and vocal timbre draw Dorian’s attention, allowing his discourse 
to capture Dorian’s consciousness and influence him on the Symbolic level. When Lord Henry 
tells Dorian who he is and what he should desire, Dorian listens.  
Lord Henry frames Dorian’s changing conception of himself by giving him language 
with which to identify. Lord Henry’s language produces a visible and psychological effect in 
Dorian, noted by both Basil and the narrative voice. Craft notes, “Lord Henry’s ﬂux of language 
suffuses Dorian’s ear … to transform his mind and visage” (123). Henry’s probing comment, 
suggesting Dorian’s secret passions and thoughts terrify and shame him, seems to illuminate 
something within Dorian: “Words!... They seemed to be able to give a plastic form to formless 
things” (60). Here, the Real within Dorian, the needs and stirrings that he had not previously 
been able to articulate or recognize, are given shape through Henry’s Symbolic representation of 
them. Suddenly, affects and internal images, things that he had previously not understood, are 
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made to signify passion, terror, and shame. However, it is important to note that, though a sense 
of these feelings may have originated within him, his ability to conceptualize them does not. It is 
language itself that creates this “understanding.” The free-indirect discourse shifts to Dorian’s 
inner consciousness, allowing a clear for a clear demonstration of how language changes his 
sense of self: 
He was dimly conscious that entirely fresh influences were at work within him. 
Yet they seemed to have come really from himself. The few words that Basil’s 
friend had said to him … had touched some secret chord that had never been 
touched before, but that he felt was now vibrating and throbbing to curious pulses. 
(Wilde 59)  
Though his subject is highly susceptible to outside influence and Lord Henry’s words have a 
distinct impact on how Dorian views his life up until this point, Dorian feels as though what 
Henry has said is a true or “real” rendering of his internal mechanisms. He believes that Henry’s 
words, rather than constructing, have instead uncovered something that already existed within 
himself, a “secret chord.”  
        Lord Henry’s words trap Dorian in a Symbolic order that subverts traditional morality. In 
Dorian’s private thoughts, the reader sees the immense authority Dorian has invested in Lord 
Henry. When he first meets Dorian, Lord Henry tells him, “‘Nothing can cure the soul but the 
senses, just as nothing can cure the senses but the soul’” (Wilde 61). Dorian always recalls this 
epigram, and, in fact, devotes himself entirely to the senses (Dickson 12). Lord Henry constructs 
a new religion with Dorian as its sole follower. For Dorian, Lord Henry becomes, if not a God, at 
least a prophet of a new order of living – a key to the knowledge of existence and reality. This 
very language is used to describe the influence of Lord Henry’s dandyist, experimental creed: 
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“Yes: there was to be, as Lord Henry has prophesied, a new Hedonism that was to re-create life, 
and save it from that harsh, uncomely puritanism that is having, in our own day, its curious 
revival… Of the asceticism that deadens the senses… it was to know nothing” (Wilde 164). Here 
words such as ‘harsh’ and ‘uncomely,’ typically associated in religious discourse with instinctual 
impulses or the brute reality of existence untouched by spirituality, are subverted to describe 
Christian spiritualty. It is not sin or gratification that ‘deadens the senses,’ but rather self-
restriction and control. Experience and hedonism are the new saviors that promise the drives 
unrestricted satisfaction. Through the law that Lord Henry sets up, instinctual impulses and both 
sensual and sexual gratification are bestowed with a new, non-conforming symbolic significance. 
Suddenly the senses are no longer a part of the taboo, instinctual side of man, but elevate him to 
a higher place. 
        If Lord Henry is the prophet of this new order of religion, the yellow book is undoubtedly 
its bible. It also exercises its influence over Dorian, making him a servant of sensory experience. 
Similarly to what is seen in the first interaction between Dorian and Lord Henry, Dorian bestows 
upon the book the power to render his own internal mechanisms, believing that this is a ‘natural’ 
process. The narrator says, “the whole book seemed to him to contain the story of his own life, 
written before he had lived it” (Wilde 161). This sentence simultaneously shows the influence of 
the book on Dorian, and the lack of insight that he has to this influence. He does not consciously 
decide to live his life, modeling himself after what he finds in the book. He simply does not 
distinguish between his own life and the book, seeing them as inextricably bound. He sees 
himself, ‘his own life’ written in its pages. Through this book, he is compelled to pursue 
experience in all forms. 
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In spite of all its seemingly liberating power, the Symbolic order instilled by Lord Henry 
and the book ultimately proves to be highly restrictive. Dorian, noting his own apathy to his 
murder of Basil and the death of James Vane, begins to fear that has been influenced for the 
worse. Because of this anxiety, he attempts reform. The Symbolic order, voiced through Lord 
Henry, however, attempts to keep him trapped by denying its influence and retaining its 
insistence that Dorian, the subject, merely is what he is. Henry says, “You will soon be going 
about like the converted, and the revivalist, warning people against all the sins of which you have 
grown tired. You are much too delightful to do that. Besides, it is no use. You and I are what we 
are and will be what we will be” (Wilde 246). Lord Henry attempts to tell Dorian the desire that 
he feels is not truly his own, and Dorian believes him. Dorian is thus forced back into a pattern 
of self-destructive behavior.  
Destroying the Image 
By the end of the novel, the portrait has completely transformed from a picture of 
Dorian’s ideal-ego to an external rendition of the punishing superego. Dorian finds, at the end of 
the novel, that the portrait torments him: “Once it had given him pleasure to watch it changing 
and growing old. Of late he felt no such pleasure. It kept him awake at night… It had been like a 
conscience to him” (Wilde 250). Whereas before Dorian was able to derive narcissistic pleasure, 
satisfying both his erotic and aggressive instincts through watching the portrait change, he now 
finds the portrait unbearable. Thinking that his body and soul have been divided completely, 
Dorian resolves to destroy the image with unexpected results.  
It is tempting to read the ending The Picture of Dorian Gray with a sense that justice has 
been served to a character fallen irreversibly into crime and moral corruption. However, it seems 
pertinent to ask what makes this image so credible. If Dorian’s identification with the beautiful 
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image is a misrecognition, a méconnaissance that sets the “I” forever in a fictional direction, is it 
not possible that Dorian’s identification with the distorted image is similarly false? If so, it seems 
more appropriate to read this ending as Dorian’s, rather than morality’s, triumph.  
 
IV. 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is narrated in the third-person (the two notable 
exceptions being the hellfire sermon and Stephen’s diary); however, the narrative voice is by no 
means objective. Joyce employs “free indirect discourse” which makes the narrative center 
somewhat ambiguous; however, the critical consensus is that the narrative voice is distinctly 
attached to Stephen’s consciousness (Erikson 53). Thus, the action of the novel is primarily 
psychological. As Hélène Cixous notes, the “reader [of A Portrait] is ushered into the mental 
circumvolutions of an extremely subjective person” (75). Everything that occurs in the novel, 
then, cannot be said to reflect an objective reality, but is rather bound up in Stephen’s Imaginary 
and Symbolic experiences through which Stephen attempts his sense of self and realize his 
desire. As a definitively modernist text, A Portrait of the Artist contains more vivid 
psychological realism (Booth 59), than The Picture of Dorian Gray. Due to this realism, the 
interplay between the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and desire in A Portrait is quite compact. The 
analysis in this section examines this interplay chronologically through the chapters, exploring 
how Stephen’s sense of self and his understanding of his own desire shifts throughout his 
development.  
Chapter I 
Since Stephen’s early home experience is so brief, Stephen’s sense of self does not start 
to emerge for the reader until his experience at Clongowes. Lacan asserts that the ego is 
“essentially a relation to the other that finds its point of departure and its fulcrum in the other” 
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(“Odd or Even?” 177). It is unsurprising, then, that Stephen first begins to establish his sense of 
self through contrast with the boys at Clongowes. In the first scene, as the other boys play, 
Stephen stays on the periphery away from the “swarming,” “throng of players” (Joyce 4). These 
phrases emphasize the homogeneity of the group, negatively implying Stephen’s difference. He 
is both physically and mentally withdrawn from the match, choosing to daydream rather than 
engage in play with the other boys. Even in sources of commonality he finds difference: “All the 
boys seemed to him very strange. They had all fathers and mothers and different clothes and 
voices” (Joyce 9). Already, in conscious ego-discourse, Stephen is forming himself as a solitary 
figure, isolated from the interests of his peers and from herd-mentality. Even at an early age, 
Stephen is an example of what Freud deems “the narcissistic man,” who seeks “his main 
satisfaction in his internal mental processes” (Civilization 31), rather than giving preference to 
emotional relationships. The reasoning for this can be understood through one of Stephen’s final 
observations in the first chapter: “He was alone. He was happy and free” (Joyce 54). Stephen 
associates solitude with autonomy; being an outsider gives him a sense of freedom and self-
mastery. It is these feelings of freedom and self-mastery that Stephen continues to chase 
throughout the narrative.  
Since it is freedom that he desires, themes of independence and isolation dominate 
Stephen’s fantasy. With no desire to connect to his peers, Stephen further forms his sense of self 
through Imaginary identification with other solitary figures. Particularly, Stephen assimilates 
heroic figures into the construction of his own experience (“Framing” 222). Stephen fantasizes 
about his own funeral and the mourners “all with sad faces” (Joyce 19). Pages later, Stephen, in a 
dream envisions the death and funeral of Parnell. This Imaginary “displacement” of himself onto 
a dead national hero (Doherty 104) allows Stephen a feeling of pride and self-importance as he 
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imagines the groups of people gathered solely to mourn his death. Later, in Chapter II, as 
Stephen becomes absorbed in the Count of Monte Cristo, he also identifies with Edmond Dantes: 
“in his imagination he lived through a train of long adventures, marvelous as those in the book 
itself, towards the close of which there appeared an image of himself” (Joyce 58). His 
identification with this character is very telling. Edmund Dantes is removed from society and 
from social bonds, even turning down Mercedes with a “proud gesture of refusal” (Joyce 58). It 
is this independence that Stephen hopes to emulate. Through identification with this character, 
Stephen first begins to imagine removing himself from social bonds in support of his ambitions. 
Stephen’s sense of self is not only established on the Imaginary plane, but also in the Symbolic.  
Throughout the novel, the Symbolic conflicts with Stephen’s Imaginary anticipation of 
self-mastery and his desire for freedom. Through his portrayal of Stephen’s relationship with the 
Catholic Church, Joyce demonstrates the formative (and, at times, damaging) effect of 
institutions on the individual’s psyche. In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud explains that 
the subject’s understanding of “good” and “bad” (in the moral sense) does not originate from 
within himself: “What is bad is often not at all what is injurious or dangerous to the ego; on the 
contrary it may be something which is desirable… there is an extraneous influence at work, and 
it is this that decides what is to be called good or bad” (71). What Freud suggests here is that 
morality, rather than being inherent, is socially determined. Lacan’s work later draws from this 
idea, localizing this process to the time when the subject assimilates language: 
It is this moment [when, through language, the I becomes the social I] that 
decisively tips the whole of human knowledge … into being mediated by the 
other's desire, constitutes its objects in an abstract equivalence due to competition 
from other people, and turns the I into an apparatus to which every instinctual 
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pressure constitutes a danger, even if it corresponds to a natural maturation 
process. (“The Mirror Stage as Formative” 79) 
For Lacan, socialization, the initiation into the Symbolic, is a restrictive process in which the 
subject must learn to formulate his desires in accordance with the wishes of the Other. Through 
socialization, which relies on language and communication, the subject finds his speech and 
behavior being adjusted to meet these wishes. The subject is thus taught how and what to desire. 
For Stephen, entry into the Symbolic is deeply rooted in religious practice and experience.  
Stephen’s religious upbringing is the “extraneous influence” which confers on him a 
specific knowledge of good and bad, and places God at the center of the Symbolic order. 
Especially in his early childhood experience, Stephen regards God with distinct awe: “It was 
very big to think of everything and everywhere. Only God could do that. He tried to think what a 
big thought that must be but could only think of God” (Joyce 12). His reflection reveals the cause 
of his awe: whereas Stephen’s own understanding of the universe is limited and undefined, 
God’s understanding is infinite and absolute. Žižek’s question, “is what we call ‘God’ not the big 
Other personified… a subject beyond all subjects?” (41) helps to define the role of God in 
Stephen’s psychological experience. For Stephen, God serves as the ultimate Other, the source 
and anchor of meaning. As Gregory Erikson notes, “For Stephen, God is the only force that can 
bridge the gap between signifier and signified” (8). This authority that his family and Jesuit 
education have taught Stephen to vest in God causes him to tailor his thoughts and actions to 
align with the desire of God and the regulations of the Church (which are assumed to speak on 
His behalf). Thus, as Hèléne Cixous explains, Stephen becomes a “product of the Church and of 
its system of threats and rewards” (76). Stephen is shaped by a Symbolic order that assumes 
itself to work on behalf of God, mediating his own individual drives and desires. 
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In Joyce’s work, the regulations of the Church on Stephen’s desire are enforced by the 
threat of punishment. The earliest expression of Stephen’s desire, in Chapter I, is met with 
reprobation: “When they were grown up he was going to marry Eileen. / He hid under the table. 
His mother said: / - O, Stephen will apologise.” (Joyce 4). Here, Stephen recognizes that he has 
committed a transgression: the act of hiding under the table is a clear expression of shame and 
fear of punishment. The transgressive nature of his expression is confirmed by his mother’s 
demand for him to apologize and Dante’s threat that, if he does not, “eagles will come and pull 
out his eyes” (Joyce 4). Stephen’s desire is deemed inappropriate because of the conventions of 
his Catholic religion, of which Dante is a rigid proponent, and thus becomes a danger to 
Stephen’s Imaginary body. Stephen’s first expression of desire is met with the threat of 
castration, the physical loss of his eyes. Literary critic Gerald Doherty concisely illuminates the 
symbolic significance of this threat: “The price of transgressing the law is not only the inability 
to return the look of the other, but even to see when it is there” (67). The consequence of 
transgressive desire is to lose the organs in which it is engendered. Stephen is thus taught from 
an early age that the expression of desire which counters the desire of the Other is a liability.  
Chapter II 
 In Chapter II, as Stephen’s consciousness develops further, the formative effects of the 
Imaginative and Symbolic orders on Stephen’s self and desire become more apparent.  Stephen’s 
vision of Mercedes conflates sexual and spiritual desires. As Stephen dwells on Mercedes, he 
filters the Real quality of sex through spiritual and romantic fantasy:  
They would meet quietly as if they had known each other and had made their 
tryst, perhaps at one of the gates or in some more secret place… in that moment 
of supreme tenderness he would be transfigured. He would fade into something 
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impalpable under her eyes and then, in a moment, he would be transfigured. 
Weakness and timidity and inexperience would fall from him in a magic moment. 
(Joyce 60) 
This image is on the one hand, decidedly sexual. As Hugh Kenner notes, the gates are evocative 
of the vagina (40), and the “moment of supreme tenderness” figuratively suggests sexual contact. 
However, Stephen’s desire for Mercedes indicates more than just a wish for sexual contact. The 
diction of this passage, with the phrase “supreme tenderness” and the word “transfigured,” has a 
definitively spiritual undertone. The image evokes an anticipation of “transcendence” 
(“Framing” 234). Stephen imagines that through this sexual contact, he will shed “weakness” 
and “inexperience,” and be “transfigured.” Stephen does not, then, merely desire sexual 
gratification; he is hoping for a spiritual experience that will give him access to his ideal-ego. 
The reader can see that Stephen is already partially alienated from his desire due to his conflation 
of its source. 
That this vision of wholeness and transcendence occurs on the Imaginary plane is no 
coincidence; the Symbolic cannot adequately capture what takes place in this moment. The 
immaturity of the prose – seen in the repetition of “transfigured,” and the vague term, “magic” – 
reflects this inadequacy. The narrative voice cannot represent Stephen’s desires in concrete terms 
(even Mercedes herself, the object-cause of desire, is described merely as an “unsubstantial 
image” (Joyce 60)). Stephen is further alienated from his desire due to the inability of language 
to represent it.  
 In the episode at his father’s school in Cork, language itself threatens Stephen’s feelings 
of autonomy. When Stephen sees the word Foetus carved into a desk, a series of shameful, 
chaotic images and memories spring to his mind. In this moment, which Patrick Parrinder 
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describes as “an explosion of consciousness” (110), Stephen finds his sense of self threatened by 
the Symbolic. Even after he leaves the anatomy theater, the image of the word persists: from his 
own mind, the “letters cut in the stained wood of the desk stared upon him, mocking his bodily 
weakness and futile enthusiasms and making him loathe himself for his own mad and filthy 
orgies” (Joyce 85). The signifier seems to have more power than Stephen. It is able to disrupt his 
mind through triggering unconscious Symbolic associations.  
 Even in the privacy of his own mind, Stephen is not free from the control of the Symbolic 
religious order. Lacan proposes that signifiers allow drives to be represented to beings of 
language (Fink 74). For Stephen, drives are represented in the language of the punishing 
superego, which deems them “brutish” and “monstrous” (Joyce 64). These words imply that 
Stephen feels himself to be inhuman. Žižek’s definition of this term helps shed light on the 
significance of this perception: Žižek notes that “inhuman” indicates being “marked by a 
terrifying excess which, although it negates what we understand as humanity, is inherent to being 
human” (47). Stephen’s chaotic feelings of sexuality are all too human; however, due the 
religious Symbolic structure he is embedded in, he is prevented from seeing himself this way. 
They have a Real effect on his body, and thus threaten to disrupt his Imaginary sense of 
wholeness and control. Additionally, they threaten to degrade Stephen’s Symbolic understanding 
of himself. Stephen thus feels that he has to attempt to control the “terrifying excess” of his 
“monstrous” drives, in order to regain the human self that the superego tells him he has 
relinquished. 
 Given some small power through winning money in an essay contest, Stephen attempts to 
appease the superego and restore control to the ego through sublimation.  This is an attempt to 
transform his erotic desire into action and what Freud calls “aim-inhibited love” (49). The 
	   	   Gordon 41 
	  
activity of this brief passage is characterized as frantic and unceasing: “He bought presents for 
everyone, overhauled his rooms, wrote out resolutions, marshalled his books up and down” 
(Joyce 92). That this brief passage is void of Stephen’s conscious thoughts and dominated by 
actions reveals Stephen’s aims: he is trying to escape his Real sexual impulses and his fantasy 
(which his superego has told him to fear) through action. However, this does not prove to be 
effective: “He had tried to … dam up, by rules of conduct and active interests and new filial 
relations, the powerful recurrence of tides within him. Useless.” (Joyce 93). Failing to align his 
own desire with the Symbolic Other, Stephen attempts to find satisfaction in rebellion. Noting 
his growing isolation from his family and from God (represented through repeated references to 
moral and immoral behavior), Stephen actually engages in activities that further distance him 
from both entities.  
At the end of Chapter II, instead of trying to prevent sexual desire, Stephen chooses to 
revel in it: “He wanted to sin with another of his kind, to force another being into sin with him 
and exult with her in sin” (Joyce 94). Stephen’s metonymic substitution of “sin” for a sexual act 
demonstrates Stephen’s Symbolic attachment between religious language and his drives. 
However, the categorization of his “drives” as sin, does not, in these final episodes of the 
chapter, have negative connotations. Freud notes that civilizations’ restrictions on sexuality 
creates a sense of injustice in the individual (Civilization 51). Stephen’s response, then, from one 
view, can be read as an act of rebellion against a God figure who attempts to control his desire. 
Taken further, it can be read as a rebellion against the very language of the God figure, as 
Stephen appropriates “sin” as a desirable term. However, with the addition of Lacanian theory, 
this reading can become more nuanced. Working from Lacanian theory, Žižek notes that even 
transgressive desires are determined by the Symbolic order, because “transgression relies on 
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what it transgresses” (42). With this in mind, it seems apparent that Stephen’s desire for rebellion 
through sex is no longer the autonomous act he believes it to be. Even when he attempts to rebel, 
the Symbolic structure that he resides in is still determining his actions. 
In spite of this misrecognition, Stephen does, temporarily, regain a feeling of power 
through sex. In a more profane version of his earlier fantasy with Mercedes, Stephen believes 
himself to have found the “transfiguration” he was searching for, in the company of a Dublin 
prostitute: “In her arms he felt that he had suddenly become strong and fearless and sure of 
himself” (Joyce 95). The phrases “strong” and “fearless” and “sure of himself” are antonymic 
reversals of the “weakness,” “timidity,” and “inexperience.” Through Stephen’s ego-discourse, 
the reader gets a sense that he has, indeed, been spiritually “transfigured.” After moments, he is 
able to shut off even the Symbolic discourse, becoming “conscious of nothing in the world” 
(Joyce 95) but sensation. It is this separation from conscious discourse that temporarily allows 
him to succumb to Imaginary wholeness. 
Chapter III 
Sexual gratification, in spite of its transformative depiction at the conclusion of Chapter 
II, proves to be debasing in Chapter III. As Parrinder notes, “Such a blissful escape from the 
realms of socially acceptable voice and speech cannot be allowed to last” (111). As Stephen’s 
conscious discourse resurfaces, so does his self-doubt. Stephen’s question, “What did it avail to 
pray when he knew that his soul lusted after its own destruction?” (Joyce 97) shows a split in his 
ego-feeling. His “soul” appears to him to have a separate will from his conscious self, as it 
unfolds itself “sin by sin” (Joyce 97). This incites a sense of fatalism in Stephen. Whereas before 
he felt autonomous, he now feels like a powerless sinner. Cixous notes, “what he had voluntarily 
begun escapes from his control before he realizes it, and he leads himself on with hopes of the 
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encounter of which he dreamed” (76). The ideal-ego that Stephen had sought through sexual 
encounter eludes his grasp, and his sexual encounter slips as the cause of Stephen’s desire.  
Plagued by feelings of guilt and sin, Stephen’s desire metonymically slips from the 
prostitute to the Virgin Mary. Stephen feels compelled towards her: “His sin, which had covered 
him from the sight of God, had led him nearer to the refuge of sinners” (Joyce 99). She appears 
as a silent, Imaginary refuge from the punishing Symbolic. As in the scene with Mercedes and 
the Dublin prostitute, the language creates an overlap between the sexual and the spiritual: 
If ever his soul, reentering her dwelling shyly after the frenzy of his body’s lust 
had spent itself was turned towards her whose emblem is the morning star… it 
was when her names were murmured softly by lips whereon there still lingered 
the foul and shameful words, the savour itself of a lewd kiss. (Joyce 99) 
It is not only as a repentant sinner that Stephen approaches Mary. Though he notes his frenzied 
lust and his “foul and shameful words,” the tone of this scene does not contain the harsh guilt of 
so many other passages in the novel. Instead, his desirousness is apparent. He approaches her as 
timidly and intimately as a young lover would: he reenters her dwelling “shyly” (a phrase which 
adds to the sexual quality of the scene by suggesting female penetration), and murmurs her 
names “softly.” The alliterative quality of the words “lips,” “lingered,” and “lewd” draw 
attention to the sensuality of the scene. Mary provides a respite for Stephen in which his 
transgressive desire and his spiritual desire can comingle, uninterrupted by Symbolic law; 
however, this respite is only temporary.  
The most notable effect of the Symbolic order on Stephen’s consciousness occurs in 
Chapter III, with Father’s Arnell’s hellfire sermon. This passage, written in a markedly different 
style from the rest of the narrative, employs a pastiche of Jesuit sermons to emphasize the power 
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of the words on Stephen’s consciousness. Father Arnell urges, “Banish from your minds all 
worldly thoughts and think only of the last things, death, judgement, hell and heaven” (Joyce 
105), and Stephen’s mind complies. The sermon suppresses the free indirect discourse of 
Stephen’s internal musings for nearly thirty pages (Cixous 73), showing, once again, the power 
of the signifier over individual consciousness.   
Even the threat of the sermon provokes the punishment of Stephen’s superego. After 
Father Arnell gives an overview of the sermon, Stephen responds in fear: “Every word of it was 
for him… The preacher’s knife had probed deeply into his diseased conscience and he felt now 
that his soul was festering in sin” (Joyce 109). The religious Symbolic, once again, shapes 
Stephen’s view of his drives and desires, evoking guilt. Cixous notes that Stephen, “however 
free, is marked by the monstrous rhetoric of punishment” (80). The superego, adopting the 
language of the religious Symbolic, causes him to believe that the preacher’s words are 
uncovering a foulness that is inherent in him.  
Stephen, provoked by Father Arnall’s elaborate descriptions of Hell, has a visceral 
reaction to vivid threat of eternal spiritual and physical torment. Castle notes that Father Arnell’s 
words exert a “painful and invasive influence” (171). This invasion is demonstrated in Stephen’s 
physical reaction: “His hands were cold and damp and his limbs ached with chill. Bodily unrest 
and chill and weariness beset him” (Joyce 130). At the words of the Symbolic, which promise 
physical torment and discomfort, Stephen’s own Real body reacts with pain. The Symbolic also 
invades Stephen’s consciousness, stirring his mind with nonsensical words: “Murmuring faces 
waited and watched; murmurous voices filled the dark shell of the cave. He feared intensely... 
but… He told himself calmly that those words had absolutely no sense” (Joyce 130). Similar to 
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the earlier scene when Stephen sees the word foetus, the Symbolic triggers a stream of words 
from his unconsciousness, disrupting his conscious mind.  
This time, however, the Real anxiety Stephen feels in this horrific scene causes language 
itself to break down; in this moment, he cannot symbolize his own thoughts. Boes notes that the 
“shock reduces the objective world to a jumble of meaningless signifiers that encroach upon and 
threaten to overwhelm the subject” (779). While the Symbolic threatens to trap Stephen in an all 
too rigid order, the Real is even more overwhelming because it strips away everything he 
believes that he knows about himself and the world. Stephen must retreat once more to the 
Symbolic.  
Out of a fear of both the pressure of his superego and the threat of disorder, Stephen 
suppresses his previous desires.  He attempts, once more, to align his desire with God’s, vowing 
to “be at one with others and with God” (Joyce 136). In the final pages of Chapter III, Stephen 
demonstrates the dual meaning of the Lacanian formula that it is “qua Other that man desires” 
(“The Subversion of the Subject” 672). As seen in the previous quote, Stephen desires Imaginary 
unity with God, to “be at one.” His desire, in one sense, is the desire of possessing (and being 
possessed by) the Other. However, it is not just unity with God that he desires, but God’s desire 
itself: “It would be so beautiful to die if God so willed. It was beautiful to live if God so willed” 
(Joyce 139). Žižek notes, “the subject desires only in so far as it experiences the Other itself as 
desiring” (42). Divining the desire of God, Stephen metonymically shifts his desire from the 
female figure to the desire of God. Once again, the illusion of Imaginary unity causes him to 
anticipate self-mastery. Chapter III concludes, “Another life! A life of grace and virtue and 
happiness! It was true. It was not a dream from which he would wake. The past was past.” (Joyce 
140). The feeling of Imaginary unity with God, the center of stability, causes Stephen to 
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(mistakenly) believe that he is in tune with his own desire and acting out of his own autonomous 
will. 
Chapter IV 
In Chapter IV, the feeling of Imaginary unity and self-mastery proves to be, once again, 
only temporary. Stephen’s short-lived “spiritual awakening” is marked by rigorous activity and 
ritual, through which he tries to sublimate his desires in activity. He involves himself heavily in 
activities to display faith and devotion: “He drove his soul daily through an increasing circle of 
works of supererogation” (Joyce 141). The increasing momentum of Stephen’s activity show that 
this life of piety is not fulfilling for Stephen. His lingering desire prompts him to try to draw 
more and more out of it. Kenner notes that Stephen’s spiritual regimen at the beginning of 
Chapter IV mirrors the vigorous activity of Chapter II (51), when Stephen tries to sublimate his 
sexual desire through familial relations and constant motion. It is another attempt to suppress his 
consciousness through compliance with Symbolic dictates. As the list of activities ends and 
Stephen’s consciousness surfaces, doubt makes itself present. He finds aspects of religious 
teaching easy to accept, but he cannot accept into his mind “the simple fact that God had loved 
his soul from all eternity” (Joyce 143). His remark indicates that the feeling of transcendence and 
Imaginary unity is dissipating. It also foreshadows Stephen’s coming separation from the 
Church. 
 Growing restless with from the monotony of spiritual piety, Stephen’s surety at the end of 
Chapter III turns to doubt. He notes, “A restless feeling of guilt would always be present with 
him: he would confess and repent and be absolved, confess and repent be absolved again, 
fruitlessly” (Joyce 147). The repetition of the pattern of action shows Stephen’s frustration with 
the monotony of religious life. The “restless” feeling threatens to pull him out of this pattern, and 
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he is no longer sure that he has truly found purpose in religious life. He tries to reassure himself, 
but his self-doubt is evident: “I have amended my life, have I not? he asked himself” (Joyce 
147). The first-person phrasing of this question is a rare interruption from the third-person style 
that dominates the narrative. This interruption in the narrative mode emphasizes Stephen’s self-
alienation and his alienation from his own desire. He himself is not sure that he is serving the 
purpose he initially believed that he was. Nor is he sure that he wants to.  
Being invited to join the priesthood is the psychological crisis that turns Stephen’s search 
for self and meaning elsewhere; however, due to Stephen’s alienation from his desire, this effect 
is not immediate. At the offer, Stephen thinks to himself, “How often had he seen himself as a 
priest wielding calmly and humbly the awful power of which angels and saints stood in 
reverence! His soul had loved to muse in secret on this desire” (Joyce 152). His Imaginary 
construction of the priest offers the illusion of autonomy, and even dominance with its “awful 
power.” The role initially appeals to Stephen’s individualistic nature for this reason. However, 
Stephen’s desire for the priesthood is not based on the reality of the role. As Castle notes, 
“Stephen’s profanation of the sacrament destabilizes the dialectic of repentance and absolution 
by exploiting [its] aesthetic thrills” (175). Just as he is on the verge of sealing his fate in a 
permanent direction, another break in his self-conception occurs.  
Stephen’s desire for autonomy causes him to reject the role of the priesthood. 
Remembering the Jesuit priests at Clongowes, Stephen wonders at “the remoteness of his own 
soul from what he had hitherto imagined her sanctuary. At the frail hold which so many years of 
order and obedience had of him when once a definite and irrevocable act of his threatened to end, 
in time and eternity, his freedom” (Joyce 155). Stephen realizes in this moment his inability to 
understand his own desires. To some extent (though not in these terms), Stephen understands the 
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hold of the religious Symbolic order on his being. Though he thought he sought union with God 
and God’s desire, he realizes that this union will not satisfy his individualistic nature.  
Stephen’s decision to reject this priesthood is not made out of conscious logic, but rather 
stems from a feeling of intuition. Parrinder observes that it is “his sense of what is innate to him” 
that causes him to make this decision (114). Stephen reflects, “The end he had been born to serve 
yet did not see allowed him to escape by an unseen path” (Joyce 158). In spite of his assurance 
that his “end” lays outside of the priesthood, Stephen has no real sense of what, precisely, that 
“end” is. While he believes himself to be acting of his own volition, the narrative structure, 
which by this point is proving to be quite cyclical, throws this into question. Kenner notes 
“Stephen’s unstable pact with the Church, and its dissolutions follows the pattern of composition 
and dissipation established by his other dreams” (50). Stephen seems to be stuck in a train of 
repetition. This repetitive sequence serves to undercut the euphoria of the following scene on 
Dollymount Beach.  
The narrative climax of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man occurs on Dollymount 
Beach. Rhythmic exultations punctuate the passage, urging “Yes! Yes! Yes!” (Joyce 163), “On 
and on and on and on!” (Joyce 165). Motifs of resurrection - “His soul had arisen from the grave 
of boyhood” (Joyce 163) - and flight - the squall, the birdgirl, the figure soaring above the sea - 
appear throughout. Together, these elements create the euphoric experience of epiphany. Stephen 
believes that he has found a new mode of living. He vows “To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to 
recreate life out of life” (Joyce 165). This declaration of his future intent seems sure; however, it 
is important to note that Stephen does not, in any way, specify what this new life will look like or 
consist of.  
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 Stephen’s desire metonymically slips again, travelling from God and the images of 
priesthood and settling his vision of the Birdgirl. Upon seeing her, Stephen reflects, “Her image 
had passed into his soul forever and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy. Her eyes 
had called him to live and his soul had leaped at the call” (Joyce 165). The image of the birdgirl 
provokes Stephen’s desire with its suggestion of flight, which itself metonymically suggests 
freedom: his soul ‘leaps’ to her soundless call.  
Like his earlier identifications with solitary heroes, Stephen’s Imaginary identification 
with Daedalus, his namesake, changes his sense of self. Reflecting on his name, Stephen resolves 
to “create proudly out of the freedom and of his soul, as the great artificer whose name he bore, a 
living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, imperishable” (Joyce 163). In this 
statement, Stephen envisions himself both as the artist, “the great artificer,” as well as the 
creation itself, “the living thing… beautiful, impalpable, imperishable.” Through identification 
with Daedalus, Stephen anticipates a mastery that will him give the power to shape his own life, 
according to his own vision and desire. This repetition suggests that Stephen is no closer to being 
able to signify (and therefore create) the ideal-ego that he anticipates. 
Chapter V 
 The ecstatic epiphany of Chapter IV is met in Chapter V with another swift and 
deadening anticlimax. Buckley notes, “The Daedalian symphony fades for the reader in the banal 
chatter of the Dedalus breakfast table” (237). As he sits at the breakfast table, memories of the 
“dark turfcoloured water” at Clongowes come flooding back to him (Joyce 167). This allusion to 
the events in Chapter I, by moving backwards in the narrative, undermines the assertion that life 
will continue “On and on and on and on” in Chapter IV. Stephen’s mind seems to be spiraling 
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back upon itself. The structures of his unconscious disable him from suppressing the oppressive 
memories of his boyhood school.  
In Chapter V, Stephen is no closer to the self-mastery that he anticipates. The aesthetic 
education that he sought out proves to be just as frustrating as his religious one. His mind 
‘wearies’ of “the search for the essence of beauty amid the spectral words of Aristotle or 
Aquinas” (Joyce 167). He finds the clarity of mind he anticipated to be clouded again by the 
words of the Symbolic. Additionally, Stephen has already grown tired of the routine and 
restrictions placed upon him in this new setting, arguing with the dean and refusing to attend 
classes. His desire for autonomy also creates a need for distance from his Irish nationalist 
classmates. As he reflects on his frustrations in the university setting, he notes, “His thinking was 
a dusk of doubt and selfmistrust lit up at moments by the lightnings of intuition” (Joyce 170). 
The dual contrast between dark and light indicate the insistent, cyclical pattern of Stephen’s 
development. The ability to signify what he desires and the way he wants to shape his life still 
eludes him. 
 As seen through the discussion of the previous chapters, A Portrait of the Artist 
continuously shifts between epiphany and bathetic anticlimax. Each chapter closes with Stephen 
feeling that he has discovered a new mode of living, only to have the following chapter open 
with despondency. Hugh Kenner notes the patterns as one of “dream nourished in contempt of 
reality, put into practice, and dashed by reality” (qtd. in Parrinder 100). Each time Stephen 
believes himself to have achieved self-mastery, he is confronted with the falsity of this feeling 
and forced to reassess. Additionally, his desire is never satisfied. It metonymically slips from 
image to image, never allowing for the possibility of restlessness to disappear. Stephen is 
consistently barred from understanding what it is that he wants, and who it is that he wants to be. 
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How, then, is the reader to take the narrative’s conclusion, which seems to promise, once again, 
that Stephen will discover both of these things?  
 It impossible not to read the triumphant tone of Stephen’s final diary entries with a high 
degree of skepticism. Buckley notes, “The fifth and last chapter hardly advances at all beyond 
the epiphany … that ends the fourth” (247). In the second to last entry, Stephen proclaims, 
“Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge 
in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (Joyce 244). Stephen’s confidence 
is apparent; he is certain that he will discover the reality of experience. Identifying with Daedalus 
as creator once again, he believes that he is now prepared to “forge” in his soul the conscience 
that seems to elude his Irish kinsman. However, given the repetitive structure of the novel, this 
bravado cannot be taken seriously. How many times has Stephen welcomed life previously, only 
to realize that he has to reassess his mode of living? Levenson notes that the apostrophe, “O 
life!” returns the reader to the “euphoric pledge” made on the beach (193) to recreate life. 
Stephen is always on the verge of freedom and self-mastery, and therefore never achieves either. 
It seems that Stephen himself is holding out for the teleological ending to his own 
Bildungsroman, when he will find his sense of unity and purpose.  
 
V. 
Through this exploration of The Picture of Dorian Gray and A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man, it seems evident that the portrayals of the self and development in the modernist 
Bildungsroman have shifted dramatically from the teleological narrative of the traditional 
Bildungsroman. Neither Stephen nor Dorian is able to achieve a stable sense of identity or a 
harmonious relationship with society.  
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While, in the traditional Bildungsroman, the protagonist is able to establish a mutually 
beneficial relationship with society, the protagonists of the modernist Bildungsroman find that 
society is ultimately antagonistic. Dorian’s relationships with Basil and Henry instill in him a 
problematic conception of moral behavior, leading him to harm both himself and others. 
Stephen’s interactions with the Church show the damaging effects that society’s institutions can 
have on individuals. These portrayals suggest that, rather than being beneficial, societal 
structures actually deter individuals from taking action in their own self-interest.  
More importantly, these novels both suggest that the self is not something that can be 
understood or mastered. In the modernist Bildungsroman, unity and mastery of the self are 
unattainable. In The Picture of Dorian Gray, Dorian is in an Imaginary misrecognition of himself 
that becomes even more distorted at the novel progresses. Caught in the triadic trap of the 
distorted self-image, Lord Henry’s assertion of the way that Dorian is, and the way that Basil 
believed him to be, Dorian ultimately destroys himself. At the conclusion of A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, Stephen finds that freedom, identity, and the knowledge of his own 
desire have once again slipped from his grasp. Though he believes himself to have discovered 
the answer once again, the repetitive structure of the novel and its lack of resolution indicate that 
this is merely another misrecognition. The sense of self-mastery Stephen hopes to achieve has 
been delayed. He is sent off again in a seemingly endless search for wholeness and freedom.  
In her reading of Lacan’s “Some Reflections of the Ego,” Jane Gallop concludes that “To 
‘master’ the self, to understand it, would be to realize its falsity, and therefore realize the 
impossibility of coinciding with one’s self. The moment of ‘self-mastery’ cannot but be infinitely 
deferred” (84). Since the anticipation of self-mastery is thematically central to both traditional 
and modernist Bildungsroman, Gallop’s reading of Lacan has important implications for 
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discussing these novels’ verisimilitude. As Gallop simply and eloquently explains, Lacan revises 
the idea of self-mastery by saying that the subject simply cannot attain it. The moment that the 
subject has mastered the self, the self disappears. Working from a psychoanalytic framework, it 
is reasonable to conclude that modernist Bildungsroman achieves a higher degree of 
verisimilitude than its predecessors by allowing its subjects to hope for, rather than achieve 
autonomy. The protagonists of the Bildungsroman are stuck in repetitive fruitless attempts at 
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